Nothing is simple in Jefferson County.

Did you mail it in? I take mine to Bessemer and it has never taken me more than 10 minutes and I'm out with permit in hand.

Consider yourself lucky.
In Tennessee there is an 8 hour class, followed by 50 round qualification with your gun, followed by fingerprinting, 3 month processing period and a agonizing day at the DMV, capped off with a $125.00 fee to get a permit.

The Constitution says you have the right to own a firearm.

It does not limit the city, county or state in what they can require of you to have one within their boundaries.

The Constitution says you have the right to own a firearm.

It does not limit the city, county or state in what they can require of you to have one within their boundaries.

The Constitution says you have the right to own a firearm.

It does not limit the city, county or state in what they can require of you to have one within their boundaries.

SECTION 2
People source of power.

That all political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit; and that, therefore, they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to change their form of government in such manner as they may deem expedient.

SECTION 26
Right to bear arms.

That every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.

SECTION 35
Objective of government.

That the sole object and only legitimate end of government is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, and when the government assumes other functions it is usurpation and oppression.

SECTION 36
Construction of Declaration of Rights.

That this enumeration of certain rights shall not impair or deny others retained by the people; and, to guard against any encroachments on the rights herein retained, we declare that everything in this Declaration of Rights is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate.

Article XVI Oath of Office.
SECTION 279

Required of members of legislature and executive and judicial officers; form; administration.
All members of the legislature, and all officers, executive and judicial, before they enter upon the execution of the duties of their respective offices, shall take the following oath or affirmation:

"I, …, solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Alabama, so long as I continue a citizen thereof; and that I will faithfully and honestly discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter, to the best of my ability. So help me God."

The oath may be administered by the presiding officer of either house of the legislature, or by any officer authorized by law to administer an oath.

Section 13A-10-101
Perjury in the first degree.

(a) A person commits the crime of perjury in the first degree when in any official proceeding he swears falsely and his false statement is material to the proceeding in which it is made.

(b) Perjury in the first degree is a Class C felony.

(Acts 1977, No. 607, p. 812, §4905.)

You can carry a firearm. U.S. and Alabama constitutions say so.

Which part of them says a city, county or state cannot require you to have a permit, register, undergo 'qualifying' training (like in Tennessee) or anything like that?

The Supreme Court said as much in Heller, didn't it? That citizens are able to possess firearms under the Second Amendment ... but it did not prevent cities, counties or states from imposing some regulations or requirements?

Wasn't that the crux of their ruling, which allows D.C. residents to possess guns but also allows the District to continue its idiotic permitting requirements?

SECTION 36

Construction of Declaration of Rights.
That this enumeration of certain rights shall not impair or deny others retained by the people; and, to guard against any encroachments on the rights herein retained, we declare that everything in this Declaration of Rights is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate.

SEC. 30.

This enumeration of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people: and, to guard against any encroachments on the rights herein retained, or any transgression of any of the high powers herein delegated, we declare, that every thing in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate; and that all laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions, shall be void.

ALABAMA.

The State v. Reid.

* * * *

THE STATE V. REID

1. The act of the 1st of February, 1839, "To suppress the evil
practice of carrying weapons secretly," does not either directly,
or indirectly tend to divest the citizen of the "right to bear arms
in defence of himself and the State;" and is, therefore consistent
with the 23d section of the 1 Art. of the constitution.

The defendant was indicted in the Circuit Court of Montgomery,
for carrying concealed about his person, a certain species of fire
arms, called a Pistol, contrary to the form of the statute, &c. To
which he pleased not guilty. Thereupon the case was submitted to
a jury, who found the defendant guilty, and assessed a fine against
him, of fifty dollars, for which sum the court rendered a judgment,
and directed that he be imprisoned in the common jail, for the
space of six hours, and thereafter, until the fine and costs were
paid.

On the trial it was proved, that the defendant carried
concealed about his person, a pistol. That while making a
settlement as sheriff, he had been attacked by an individual of a
dangerous and desperate character, who afterwards threatened his
person,
and came to his office several times to look for him. It was also
proved, that these threats were communicated to the defendant, and
the pistol brought to him by a friend, who conceived his life was
in danger.

The defendant thereupon moved the court, to charge the jury,
that the law on which the indictment was founded was
unconstitutional, and that the defendant could not be convicted;
which charge was refused by the court. The defendant then moved
the court, to charge the jury, that if they believed from the
evidence that the defendant carried the weapon concealed for the
purpose of defending his person, and that it was necessary, to
carry the weapon concealed for that purpose, then, they should
acquit the defendant, which charge was also refused. Whereupon the
court charged the jury, that the law upon which the indictment was
founded, was constitutional, and that although the jury might
believe from the evidence, that the defendant carried the weapon
for the defence of his person, and although it was necessary for
his defence that the weapon should be concealed, yet these facts
would only go in mitigation, and did not constitute a complete
defence. Which charge, as well as the refusal to give the several
charges asked for; were at the request of the defendant referred to
this court for its decision, as presenting novel and difficult
questions of law.

The defendant then moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground,
that the statute on which the indictment was founded was
unconstitutional, which motion was overruled by the court, and the
question of law thereupon arising referred to this court, as novel
and difficult.

The Attorney General for the State, argued that it was
competent for the Legislature to prohibit the wearing of concealed
weapons, that such a law did not conflict with the constitutional
provision, which guarantied to the citizen the right to bear arms
in the defence of himself and the State. That the statute under
which the defendant was convicted did not impair that right,
while it proposed to discountenance by punishment, a practice which
bad been greatly promotive of violence and bloodshed.
[Note: So why does the state now allow such practice to be licensed by
the sheriff??]

Every man was still left free to carry arms openly, the only manner
in which they could be used for defensive purposes.

Mr. Goldthwaite for the defendant, insisted that the act of
the Legislature on which the indictment was founded, abridges the
right secured to the citizen by the 23d section of the 1st article
of the constitution. There is no restriction on the exercise of
the right, and as the grant is in general terms, the Legislature
cannot prescribe limits to it. [1 Story on Con. 407-8: Sturgus v.
Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. Rep. 102-202: Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2
Litt. Rep. 90.] Has not a subsequent Legislature (if the statute
in question be constitutional) the right to prohibit the carrying
of arms openly, and both acts being in force, the right of carrying
arms at all, would be taken away. Such a state of things, all will
admit, cannot exist without a violation of the constitution.

The constitution of the United States, provides that the
liberty of the press shall not be abridged. The authorities are
clear that no previous restraint shall be imposed upon
publications. [3 Story on Con. 736.] The party publishing is
responsible for the abuse of the liberty. [3 Story on Con. 748.]
So in regard to the bearing of arms, the person making an improper
use of them is amenable to the laws, though he may carry them in
any manner he pleases.

COLLIER, C. J.--By the first section of the act, "to suppress
the evil practice of carrying weapons secretly," [Acts of 1838-9]
it is enacted, " that if any person shall carry concealed about his
person, any species of fire arms, or any Bowie knife, Arkansas
tooth pick, or any other knife of the like kind, dirk, or any other
deadly weapon, the person so offending, shall on conviction
thereof, before any court having competent jurisdiction, pay a fine
not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, to be
assessed by the jury trying the case; and be imprisoned for a term
not exceeding three months, at the discretion of the judge of said
court." Under this section the defendant was indicted, and he
insists that it is repugnant to the constitution of this State,
which declares that, "Every citizen
has a right to bear arms, in defence of himself and the State,"
[23d sec., 1 art. of the Con.] and is, therefore, inoperative and
void.

A provision similar to that, with which the statute in
question is said to come in collision, is contained in the
constitutions of several of the States, and was doubtless suggested
by the "Bill of Rights" of the 1 W. and M. which embodies many
provisions in favor of the liberty of the subject, and is said to
be for the most part, in affirmance of the common law. That
enactment after declaring it against law, to raise or keep a
standing army in the kingdom in time of peace, without the consent
of Parliament, declares "that the subjects which are Protestants
may have arms for their Defence, suitable to their Conditions and
as allowed by law." [6 vol. Statutes of the Realm, 143; Crabb's
Eng. Law, 570.]

The bill of rights was doubtless induced by the high
perogative claims of the Stuarts, even after the restoration of
Chas. the II., but more especially by the extraordinary assumptions
of Jas. the II., by which he attempted to assail the liberties and
religion of the people, and to render inefficient the enactments of
Parliament, by the exercise of a dispensing power.

The bill of rights, among other things confirms the
declaration of rights, to which the Prince of Orange yielded his
assent in the presence of both houses of Parliament, upon ascending
the throne. That instrument recited the illegal and arbitrary acts
committed by the late King, and declared almost in the terms of the
recital, that such acts were illegal. The evil which was intended
to be remedied by the provision quoted, was a denial of the right
of Protestants to have arms for their defence, and not an
inhibition to wear them secretly. Such being the mischief, the
remedy must be construed only to extend so far as to effect its
removal.

We have taken this brief notice of the English statute, as it
may serve to aid us in the construction of our constitutional
provision, which secures to the citizen the right to bear arms.
[Note: What about Section 30 of our own Constitution of Alabama 1819???]

It was argued for the defendant that, where the constitution
grants a power, it must be understood to grant it entire; and in
such a case, it will be incompetent for the Legislature to enact a
law in derogation of it. The constitutional provision which we are
to examine, cannot be considered as conferring either upon the
Legislature, or the people any new or additional authority. The
constitution of a State, is an instrument of restraint and
limitation upon powers already plenary, so far as it respects the
functions of government and the objects of legislation. We are
then, to regard the provision in question, as a guaranty to the
people of the right to bear arms, "in defence of themselves and the
State," and an inhibition upon the Legislature to divest it
by any enactment.

The question recurs, does the act, "To suppress the evil
practice of carrying weapons secretly," trench upon the
constitutional rights of the citizen. We think not. The
constitution in declaring that, "Every citizen has the right to
bear arms in defence of himself and the State," has neither
expressly nor by implication, denied to the Legislature, the right
to enact laws in regard to the manner in which arms shall be borne.
[Note: What about Section 30 of the Constitution of Alabama 1819???]
The right guarantied to the citizen, is not to bear arms upon all
occasions and in all places, but merely "in defence of himself and
the State." The terms in which this provision is phrased seems to
us, necessarily to leave with the Legislature the authority to
adopt such regulations of police, as may be dictated by the safety
of the people and the advancement of public morals. The statute of
1 Wm. and M. while it declares the right of the subject, it refers
to Parliament to determine what arms shall be borne and how; while
our constitution being silent as to the action of the Legislature,
does not divest it of a power over the subject, which pertained to
it independent of an express grant.
[Note: What about Section 30 of the Constitution of Alabama 1819???]

We do not desire to be understood as maintaining, that
regulating the manner of hearing arms, the authority of the
Legislature has no other limit than its own discretion. A statute
which, under the pretence of regulating, amounts to a destruction
of the right, or which requires arms to be so borne as to render
them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, would be clearly
unconstitutional.
[Note: What does a law that requires a permit to carry a pistol in a
vehicle both openly and concealed do???]
But a law which is intended merely to promote
personal security, and to put down lawless aggression and violence,
and to that end inhibits the wearing of certain weapons, in such a
manner as is calculated to exert an unhappy influence upon the
moral feelings of the wearer, by making him less regardful of the
personal security of others, does not come in collision with the
constitution.
[Note: So this is what a pistol license allows now???]

We are aware that the court of Appeals of Kentucky, in Bliss
v. Commonwealth, [2 Litt. Rep. 90] attained a conclusion seemingly
the opposite of that to which our judgments incline. In that case,
the appellant was indicted under a statute which is in these words,
"That any person in this commonwealth who shall hereafter wear a
pocket pistol, dirk, large knife, or sword in a cane concealed as
a weapon, unless when travelling on a journey, shall be fined in
any sum not less than one hundred dollars; which may be recovered
in any court having jurisdiction of like sums, by action of debt or
on the presentment of a grand jury; and a prosecutor in such
presentment shall not be necessary. One half of such fine shall be
to the use of the informer; and the other to the use of this
commonwealth." The twenty third section of the tenth article of
the constitution of Kentucky, provides "that the right of the
citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State, shall
not be questioned;" and the question before the court was, did the
act of the Legislature impugn the right secured by the
constitution.

The court considered that the right to hear arms, existed
without any restriction, at the adoption of the constitution, and
that the right of the "citizen" was as directly assailed by the
provisions of the statute, as though they were forbid carrying guns
on their shoulders, swords in scabbards, or when in conflict with
an enemy were not allowed the use of bayonets. "If the act
be consistent with the constitution" say the court, "it cannot
be incompatible with that instrument, for the Legislature by
successive enactments, to entirely cut off the exercise of the
right of the citizens to bear arms. For in principle, there is no
difference between a law prohibiting the wearing concealed arms,
and a law prohibiting the wearing such as are exposed; and if the
former be unconstitutional, the latter must be so likewise.

"We may possibly be told, that though a law of either
description may be enacted consistently with the constitution, it
would be incompatible with that instrument, to enact laws of both
descriptions. But if either, when alone, be consistent with the
constitution, which it may be asked, would be incompatible with
that instrument, if both were enacted.

"The law first enacted would not be; for as the argument
supposes, either may be enacted consistent with the constitution,
that which is first enacted must, at the time of enactment, be
consistent with the constitution; and if then consistent, it cannot
become otherwise by any subsequent act of the Legislature. It
must, therefore, be the latter act, which the argument infers would
be incompatible with the constitution.

"But suppose the order of enactment was reversed, and instead
of being the first, that which was first, had been the last; the
argument to be consistent should nevertheless, insist on the last
enactment being in conflict with the constitution. So that the
absurd consequence would thence follow, of making the same act of
the Legislature, either consistent with the constitution, or not
so, according as it may precede or follow some other enactment of
a different import. Besides, by insisting on the previous act
producing any effect on the latter, the argument implies, that the
previous one operates as a partial restraint on the right of the
citizens to hear arms, and proceeds on the notion, that by
prohibiting the exercise of the residue of right not affected by
the first act, the latter act comes in collision with the
constitution. But it should not be forgotten, that it is not only
part of the right that is secured by the constitution; it is the
right entire and complete, as it existed at the adoption of the
constitution; and if any portion of that right be impaired,
immaterial how small the part may be, and immaterial the order of
time at which it may be done, it is equally forbidden by the
constitution."

We have thought it proper to state thus at length, the argu-
ment employed by the court, in Bliss v. Commonwealth, because it
places in a very strong point of view, the objection to the statute
we are called on to examine. Whether the peculiar terms employed
in the Kentucky constitution, viz: "That the right of the citizens
to bear arms, &c. shall not be questioned," influenced to any
extent, the conclusion of the court, that the right could not be
regulated, but must remain as it was at the time of its adoption,
we are not prepared to say. Yet, we, are strongly inclined to
believe, that the inhibition to question the right, was regarded as
more potent than a mere afirmative declaration, intended to secure
it to the citizen; and that the one amounted to a denial of the
right to legislate on the subject, the other would tolerate
legislation to any extent which did not actually or in its
consequences destroy the right to bear arms.

But the court say that it is a matter which will not admit of
legislative regulation, and in order to test the correctness of its
opinion, supposes one Legislature to prohibit the bearing secretly,
and a subsequent Legislature to enact a law against bearing them
openly; and then asks the question, whether the first or last
enactment would be unconstitutional. Under the provision of our
constitution, we incline to the opinion that the Legislature cannot
inhibit the citizen from bearing arms openly, because it authorizes
him to bear them for the purposes of defending himself and the
State, and it is only when carried openly, that they can be
efficiently used for defence.
[Note: The court of last resort said that the Legislature cannot
inhibit the citizen from bearing arms openly, yet a permit is required
to carry a pistol openly in a vehicle???]

In respect to the two prohibitory enactments supposed by the
court of Appeals of Kentucky, we should be disposed to think, if
either one, when standing alone, would be constitutional that the
last would be regarded as an expression of the will of the
Legislature when enacted, and as it could not operate in harmony
with the first, would by implication, repeal it. This view, we
think, accords with the decision of the supreme court of the United
States, in Sturges v. Crowninshield, (4 Wheat. Rep. 122) in which
the question arose, whether the Legislature of a State, possessed
the constitutional right to enact a bankrupt law, inasmuch as the
power to establish a general bankrupt law was con-
ferred upon Congress, by the constitution of the United States. The
court were of opinion, that the right to adopt such a measure
pertained to the Legislatures of the States, previous to the
ratification of the Federal constitution, and that the insertion in
that instrument, of an afirmative grant of power to Congress to
legislate on the subject, did not ipso facto, divest the
pre-existent right of the States, until Congress had exercised the
power conferred. But when this was done, then the local laws would
become inoperative.

Without further noticing the case of Bliss v. Commonwealth, it
may be proper to remark, that it received the assent of but two of
the Judges of the court of appeals, while it was dissented from by
the third.

In The State v. Mitchell (3 Blackf. Rep. 229;) it appears that
the defendant was indicted under a section of a statute of Indiana,
which is as follows: "That every person, not being a traveller, who
shall wear or carry any dirk, pistol, sword in a cane, or other
dangerous weapon concealed, shall upon conviction thereof, be fined
in any sum not exceeding one hundred dollars." (Laws of Indiana,
ed. of 1831, p. 192.) It was insisted that this enactment was
opposed to the constitution of Indiana, which declares "that the
people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and
the State;" but the court decided against the objection; and held
the act to be constitutional.

The difference between the terms used in the constitution of
Indiana, and that of our own State, is so entirely immaterial, that
it could not possibly authorize a difference of construction.

The cases cited; are the only adjudications we have been able
to find, in regard to the right of the people to bear arms; and
while the one sustains the constitutionality of the enactment in
question, the other does not disprove it. But let it be conceded
that it is doubtful, whether the statute does not come in collision
with the constitution, yet it is our duty to maintain its validity.
It has received the assent of the two houses of the General
Assembly and the Governor, under a solemn pledge to support the
constitution; and their opinion is at least, prima facie evidence,
that they have not overstepped the limits of legislative
competency. Before the judiciary can with propriety declare an act
of the Legislature unconstitutional, a case should be presented in
which there is no rational doubt. (Bank of Newbern v. Taylor, 1
Caro. L. Repo: 246; Ex parte McCollum 1 Cow. Rep. 550.)

It appears from the case as referred to this court, that the
defendant moved the circuit judge "to charge the jury, that if they
believed from the evidence, that the defendant carried the weapon
concealed for the purpose of, defending his person, and that it was
necessary to carry the weapon concealed for that purpose, then,
they should acquit the defendant; which charge was also refused."
There was no evidence adduced, tending to show that the defendant
could not have defended himself by carrying the pistol openly, as
by secreting it about his person: it is difficult to conceive, how
one could be placed in such an attitude, consistently with the law
which recognizes the right of self-protection. If the emergency is
pressing, there can be no necessity for concealing the weapon, and
if the threatened violence will allow of it, the individual may be
arrested and constrained to find sureties to keep the peace, or
committed to jail. The charge asked for, was then upon an abstract
point of law.

In the case at bar, the defendant needed no arms for his
protection, his official authority furnished him an ample shield.
In this country a sheriff possesses all the powers, which pertained
to his office at common law; except so far as they may have been
divested by statute, or such as are incompatible with the nature of
our institutions. He is the keeper of the peace within the county.
He may apprehend, and commit to prison, all who break the peace, or
attempt to break it; and may cause such persons to be bound in a
recognizance to keep the peace. He may, and is bound ex officio,
to pursue and take all traitors, murderers, felons, and rioters; he
also hath the custody and safekeeping of the county jail; he is to
defend the same against rioters, and for this purpose, as well as
for taking rioters and others breaking the peace, he may call to
his aid the posse comitatus, or power of the county, and the citizens
are bound to obey his summons, upon pain of fine and imprisonment.
(1 Bla. Com. 343;, Watson's Shff. 2.)

We will not undertake to say, that if in any case, it should
appear to be indispensable to the right of defence that arms should
be carried concealed about the person, the act "to suppress the
evil practice of carrying weapons secretly," should be so construed
as to operate a prohibition in such case. But in the present case,
no such necessity seems to have existed; and we cannot well
conceive of its existence under any supposable circumstances.

We have only to add, that the judgment of the circuit court of
Montgomery, is affirmed.

Section 11-45-1.1
Subject matter of handguns reserved to State Legislature; power of municipality to adopt certain ordinances; concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts with district courts.

No incorporated municipality shall have the power to enact any ordinance, rule, or regulation which shall tax, restrict, prevent, or in any way affect the possession or ownership of handguns by the citizens of this state. The entire subject matter of handguns is reserved to the State Legislature. This section shall not be construed to limit or restrict the power of a municipality to adopt ordinances which make the violation of a state handgun law a violation of a municipal ordinance to the same extent as other state law violations, or to limit or restrict the power of a municipal court to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the district court over violations of state handgun laws which may be prosecuted as breaches of a municipal ordinance.

(Acts 1982, No. 82-442, p. 694, §1; Acts 1994, No. 94-635, p. 1195, §1.)