If the GW did do something wrong, they would just quietly "retire" him. Isn't that how it works?

... On February 7, 2005, John Raley sued James Allen Main, in his capacity as finance director of the State of Alabama; Troy King, in his capacity as the attorney 572*572 general of the State of Alabama; the State of Alabama General Liability Trust Fund ("the Fund"); and the State of Alabama (these defendants are collectively hereinafter referred to as "the State defendants"). He also named as a defendant Joyce Sharpley, in her capacity as the administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, James Sharpley. Raley sought a judgment declaring whether the State defendants were obligated to provide him a defense and indemnification in an action brought by Sharpley against him in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Northeastern Division. The State defendants answered the complaint asserting certain affirmative defenses and generally denying that they were obligated to defend or indemnify Raley in the federal litigation...


... The State defendants initially chose to defend Raley in the federal action under a reservation of rights. However, after Raley was convicted of manslaughter, he was excluded from coverage by the Fund based on the criminal-acts exclusion in the Fund guidelines. Once the coverage issue was resolved against Raley, the State defendants were no longer obligated to defend Raley based on their reservation to provide a defense "only until the matter of coverage [could] be resolved" and "to withdraw from the defense ... at a later date." Further, we cannot say that the State defendants acted beyond the discretion afforded by section 5 in refusing to defend Raley, because he had been excluded from coverage by the Fund based on the criminal-acts exclusion. Raley cites Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Youngblood, 549 So.2d 76 (Ala.1989), and argues that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. Youngblood, however, is distinguishable from this case in that Youngblood deals with an insurer's duty to defend its insured, whereas here we have already determined that an insurer/insured relationship does not exist between Raley and the Fund. Accordingly, we conclude that the State defendants do not owe Raley a duty to defend him in the federal litigation brought by Sharpley...

... Daniel filed an action against Hodges, a game warden, for false imprisonment (two counts) and malicious prosecution (two counts) claiming $1,000 damages. He joined as defendant Western Casualty and Surety Company, surety on Hodges' bond. Code 1940, T. 41, §§ 50, 51 and 115, as amended.

This appeal is from a judgment in Hodges' favor based on a verdict directed (with hypothesis) by the trial judge...

... We consider, however, that the expression "and shall arrest without warrant * * * any person violating any of * * the game * * * laws" incorporates by reference the provisions of Code 1940, T. 15, § 154, which provides as follows:

"An officer may also arrest any person, without warrant, on any day and at any time, for any public offense committed, or a breach of the peace threatened in his presence; or when a felony has been committed, though not in his presence, by the person arrested, or when a felony has been committed, and he has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested committed it; or when he has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony, although it may afterwards appear that a felony had not in fact been committed; or on a charge made, upon reasonable cause, that the person arrested has committed a felony."

Hunting on another person's land in the day time without his permission is a misdemeanor. Since Hodges arrested Daniel without a warrant and without the offense being committed in his presence, his restraint of Daniel's liberty made a prima facie cause of action. Accordingly, the affirmative charge should not have been given as to the counts of the complaint charging Hodges with unlawful imprisonment.

The judgment below is due to be reversed and the cause there remanded.

Reversed and remanded.