Originally Posted By: augustus_65
The new regulation does not apply to any species other than deer and hogs so there will be no rebuttable presumption for other game and section 9-11-244 applies. So you could not hunt turkeys in an area where a supplemental deer feeding program is in place. The area definition in 220-2.157 does not apply.


So what does the words "affected area" mean when hunting those other protected species? Isn't the statute void for its vagueness in that regard?

There have been several failed attempts to define the words "affected area" by our legislature and by the Advisory Board of Conservation. If they can't decide what it means, how are hunters given fair warning of what is required of them by the language of the statute?




Some recent case law to consider:

Quote:
"`"As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 [357], 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983) (citations omitted). A statute challenged for vagueness must therefore be scrutinized to determine whether it provides both fair notice to the public that certain conduct is proscribed and minimal guidelines to aid officials in the enforcement of that proscription. See Kolender, supra; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972).'"
Lansdell v. State, 25 So. 3d 1169, 1175-76 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting in Vaughn v. State, 880 So. 2d 1178, 1195 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003); further citations omitted); cf. State v. Cohen, 696 So. 2d 435, 439-440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (referencing the due process requirement that criminal statutes must apprise ordinary persons of common intelligence what is prohibited).

"`"`A vague statute does not give adequate "notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties," Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340, 72 S. Ct. 329, 330, 96 L. Ed. 367, 371 (195[2]), is not "sufficiently focused to forewarn of both its reach and coverage," United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. at 33, 83 S. Ct. at 598, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 566, and "may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning," Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227-28 (1972).

"`"`As the United States Supreme Court observed in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S. Ct. 665, 92 L. Ed. 840 (1948):
"`"`"There must be ascertainable standards of guilt. Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the enactment. The vagueness may be from uncertainty in regard to persons within the scope of the act, or in regard to the applicable tests to ascertain guilt."'"'"
Vaughn v. State, 880 So. 2d 1178, 1194-95 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting McCall v. State, 565 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); further citations omitted).




EX PARTE ALABAMA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Ala: Supreme Court 2011