No it would not RMcL. It's simple. If you want the extra hunting time get a bow, crossbow, spear, pistol, slingshot, rock or what ever and take advantage of the special seasons. If not don't sit around and whine about those of us that do. This argument makes absolutely no sense at all.
Shaw,
You and the other bow hunters whined about the "greased wheels" of the Advisory Board cramming crossbows down your throats... did you not? Now you're whining because I want to protect my right to hunt from unreasonable restrictions.
Let's get this straight. Hunting is a fundamental right. It is not a privilege to be toyed with by you or anyone else. Neither is keeping and bearing arms to be toyed with. The Pilgrims would never have allowed restrictions from bearing arms for use in hunting, and I won't condone it either.
The people of Alabama recognized that hunting and fishing involve wildlife resources that are not unlimited and must therefore be subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of all of us.
Your pet bow hunting restrictions on the right of other hunters to hunt on their own lands or on leased lands do not serve the lawful purpose of conserving wildlife in the least restrictive way.
Here's what the Alabama Supreme Court said in a recent opinion about restrictions on a fundamental right like hunting:
"
State action that limits a fundamental right is generally subject to strict scrutiny. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988)
("[C]lassifications affecting fundamental rights ... are given the most exacting scrutiny."); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971)
("It is enough to say that the classification involved... was subjected to strict scrutiny under the compelling state interest test... because it impinged upon the fundamental right of interstate movement.").
Strict scrutiny generally requires that the state show a compelling interest, advanced by the least restrictive means. As the United States Supreme Court said in the context of the First Amendment: "The Government may, however, [limit a fundamental right] in order to promote a compelling interest
if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest. . . .
It is not enough to show that the Government's ends are compelling;
the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends." Sable Commc'ns of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989).
The nature of a compelling interest varies based on the circumstances, but it is a very stringent standard; as the United States Supreme Court said in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972):
"The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to" a fundamental right. 406 U.S. at 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526 (emphasis added).
Therefore,
"we must searchingly examine the interests the state seeks to promote." 406 U.S. at 221, 92 S.Ct. 1526. See also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Here, the State of Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest—to say nothing of a compelling one—in second-guessing a fit parent's decision regarding visitation with third parties.").
The decisions of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals here properly applied a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, as required by Santosky, supra. The clear and convincing evidence must demonstrate, however, that the state has a compelling interest requiring interference with the rights of the parents
and that that interest is being advanced by the least restrictive means. The Act fails to provide for the application of this standard."
Ex parte ERG, 73 So. 3d 634 - Ala: Supreme Court 2011 
