Aldeer.com Forums Alabama Deer Talk Serious Deer Talk Forum Disputing a Deer baiting Citation - A Little Help?

It's not a loophole. The fact is in order to be guilty of this offense he has to meet the test of 'knew or should have known' that he was hunting over bait. He (1) did not place the bait on the ground. He (2) didn't know the bait existed because the bait was never observed as anything other than a stump (if at all) - i.e. due to its appearance and distance from the blind, it would not have appeared as bait to any reasonable person such as a pile of corn would. And (3) I didn't tell him there was anything in the food plot.

He is not guilt of this offense because this is not a 'strict liability' offense. All you need to do to attain that understanding is read the code and supporting information.

Section 13A-2-3
Requirements for criminal liability in general and for offenses of strict liability and of mental culpability.

The minimum requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing. If that conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense, or if an offense or some material element thereof does not require a culpable mental state on the part of the actor, the offense is one of "strict liability." If a culpable mental state on the part of the actor is required with respect to any material element of an offense, the offense is one of "mental culpability."

(Acts 1977, No. 607, p. 812, �310.)

Section 13A-2-4
Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements.

(a) When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, such mental state is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless the context thereof indicates to the contrary.

(b) Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, an appropriate culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, states a crime of mental culpability.

(c) If a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts recklessly, knowingly or intentionally. If recklessness suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts knowingly and intentionally. If acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.

(Acts 1977, No. 607, p. 812, �315.)

Because we conclude that a conviction under � 9-11-244 requires a showing that the defendant either knew or should have known that the area over which he was hunting was baited, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Phillips could be found guilty even without proof that he baited the field or knew that the field was baited. Therefore, we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I'll keep all of that in mind, 49er. Thanks for the input.

Fred - that $500 was written on the citation. He was given an option to simply pay the fine as an admission of guilt and have the offense on his record. He choose not to do that. Now he has a trail date.

Just curious, not being a smarty... in your original post you initially said, " I also accept full responsibility for this mess". Then you asked your friend to fight this but only offered to pay half the legal fees. Why only half? In my opinion, and that's all it is, an opinion. If YOU put out the bait without checking the regulations, YOU put the man in the stand without telling him, while it was dark and he didn't even have the opportunity to see it where he could have the chance to identify it or mistake it for a stump. YOU should pay ALL fees/fines. The only thing the man did wrong was trust that you were following the law, and I know you thought you were. Trying to beat it on a technicality is wrong because had you read the regulations you would have either A) not put out the bait, or, B) not put the man in that stand. You wouldn't have argued definitions, interpretations or past legal cases.

So, respectfully, do you have anything useful to add?

I do know that in the case of a baited dove field, if the 'shooters' or hunters are pay-hunters or guests that did not control the field and did not know it was baited, the ticket can be issued to the landowner/manager.

So, maybe there is a possibility that the ticket could be issued to you instead your friend???

??? I wasn't implying you were trying to beat it on a technicality. I meant that others seem to be trying to "push" you to do so. Don't be so sensitive.

I can not believe that I am getting into this, but, under the should have known past, he has a duty to look around the area.

As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (citations omitted). A statute challenged for vagueness must therefore be scrutinized to determine whether it provides both fair notice to the public that certain conduct is proscribed and minimal guidelines to aid officials in the enforcement of that proscription. See Kolender, supra; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). If the statute "either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application", it is void for vagueness. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).

"The void for vagueness doctrine ... protects against legislation providing insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful. E.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). The doctrine was stated by the United States Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 [357], 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983), as follows: `... the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' (Citations omitted.) The Court in Kolender, supra, further opined that the most important aspect of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is `not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine�the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement,' quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). These minimal guidelines should be provided in order to avoid `a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors and juries to pursue their personal predilections.' Smith, supra, at 575, 94 S.Ct. at 1248." 1265*1265 Kerr v. State, 474 So.2d 142, 144 (Ala.Crim. App.1984), rev'd on other grounds, Ex parte Kerr, 474 So.2d 145 (Ala.1985).